Ferrari technicians (more or less the same ones, let’s say since 2017) are dealing with a curious “pendulum” phenomenon. They swing the pendulum of the car they create without ever achieving overall excellence. If one year they build a car that generates a lot of downforce, the next year they make one that is highly efficient. Aerodynamic engineers have taught us that there is (to simplify a lot) an inverse relationship between downforce and efficiency.
So, when designing an F1 car, the goal is to make it generate enough downforce while being efficient enough on the straights, making it fast in all conditions. If one has to choose, it’s better to have a car that leans towards downforce since, overall, the competitive results on various circuits (with different types of corners) would be better.
We imagine that if they only raced on ovals, for example, aerodynamic efficiency would be more critical. However, as F1 includes circuits with various types of corners, finding the optimal balance during the design phase is not easy or trivial. Let’s say it right away, Ferrari has not succeeded in this since 2017, to create an excellent car in every aspect.
A necessary clarification: we are not considering the years 2020-2021. Let us explain why, and you know very well what we are referring to. At the end of 2019, the case of the “Ferrari engine” explodes. Do you remember Max Verstappen’s words? Ferrari cheats (with the engine). Meanwhile, the internal feud between Maurizio Arrivabene and Mattia Binotto escalates, leading to Arrivabene being ousted and Binotto becoming the “pharaoh.” Sorry, we meant Team Principal.
We know very well that, due to the “mysterious” case related to the 2019 PU (Power Unit), even though mouths remain shut, without mincing words, Ferrari suffered a castration, or rather, a cancellation of the hybrid unit. Binotto found himself handling the hot potato that he already knew well as the head of the power unit department and technical director. The result is evident that he didn’t negotiate very well. However, we add that he probably couldn’t have done more, although we still have some doubts.
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Why couldn’t he have done more? Because of a plausible tip-off from a disgraced Ferrari technician. In essence, those from Place de La Concorde would have told Binotto (more or less): scrap the 2019 PU. And in a few months, in Gestione Sportiva, they had to come up with a new unit from a blank sheet of paper, which looked terribly similar (but this is our wickedness) to the engine of the infamous F14T car.
The following car was an evolution of the SF1000 (the revolutionary regulation changes, delayed due to Covid, were expected to take place a year later), and it inherited the few strengths and many flaws, including the “nanomotor,” albeit improved. We do not include these two cars in the assessment because, especially the first one, it was designed for a power unit with at least 100 horsepower more. In practice, instead of propelling it, the engine acted like a parachute (a joke, but I think we’ve conveyed the concept).
Ferrari: The Ever-Changing Technical concept
Let’s see what the technical department in Gestione Sportiva has “cooked up” without those two disastrous years. We call it the “pendulum swing”, as explained by F1 expert Mariano Froldi for FUnoanalisitecnica.
2017: Monstrous downforce, poor efficiency (remember SPA?)
2018: Slightly lower downforce, better efficiency, a great engine (remember SPA again?)
2019: Non-existent downforce, excellent efficiency, a superb engine.
2022: High downforce, reduced efficiency.
2023: Low downforce, good efficiency.
A constant, dating back probably to 2014, is that the developments made on the cars (particularly the mysterious object that is the floor) have not had the desired effects; sometimes they even worsened the car. The biennium mentioned above shows a partial change in trend, but it doesn’t count due to what was said in the introduction. A side note: At the end of 2016, James Allison leaves (who brought fortunes to Mercedes), and Simone Resta, the architect of some SF-70H insights, goes to Alfa Romeo-Sauber in May 2018 (a curious case: in August 2019, he is called back to Ferrari, only to leave again on January 1, 2021, for another satellite team, Haas).
In recent months, David Sanchez has left (who returned to McLaren). Enrico Cardile remains in his position (and there are even rumors that he could be the new Technical Director, as heard in the paddock). Here is the pendulum. Not once have our “heroes” produced a balanced car. So how can we be optimistic for 2024 when these same men keep swinging from one extreme to another and are also deprived of several key figures? Only time will tell…
