Ferrari’s communication problems have followed the team for decades, from Gilles Villeneuve and Alain Prost to Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc. Throughout its history, Maranello has accommodated drivers with radically different personalities, but public criticism of the team has rarely been tolerated. The recurring problem is that Ferrari’s determination to control information can leave its own drivers in the dark, creating precisely the tensions it then seeks to contain.
One of the clearest recent examples came on 26 September, during the Baku Grand Prix weekend. In a post-race interview with Sky, Charles Leclerc was casually explaining that he had the latest power unit specification, ADUO 2. At that point, the press officer standing beside him gave him a piercing look, followed by a nervous smile and a shake of the head. The Ferrari driver immediately noticed and added that he had not realised he was revealing something he was not supposed to disclose.
After all, the race had already taken place, with Charles Leclerc finishing fourth and Lewis Hamilton sixth. What purpose could concealing the engine specification still serve? One possible explanation lies in Ferrari’s relatively disappointing result: by leaving uncertainty over which engine specification had been used, the team could preserve the impression that more performance was still available. The online reaction was immediate, and the clip went viral, fuelling an existing debate about the lack of transparency in Ferrari’s communication.
Twelve days later, on 8 October, Ferrari handed control of its social media accounts to Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc for two hours. The team subsequently described the episode in a humorous statement, suggesting that two people within the organisation had taken unauthorised control and made questionable editorial decisions.
The two situations could hardly appear more different, yet they reveal the same underlying habit. Ferrari accepts almost any type of driver, provided nobody publicly criticises the team. It allows spontaneity when that spontaneity has been carefully prepared, while withholding information from its own people to prevent rivals from learning anything. In doing so, it can provoke the very outbursts it later condemns.
That pattern stretches from Enzo Ferrari to the present day. The personalities have changed, as have the people responsible for responding to controversies, but the underlying mechanism has remained remarkably consistent.
Enzo Ferrari accepted every personality, but only one voice could speak for the team
Enzo Ferrari welcomed drivers with very different personalities and, judging by historical accounts, tolerated their excesses with surprising patience. With Gilles Villeneuve, whom Piero Ferrari described as a driver guided entirely by instinct and prone to destroying too many cars, he was even willing to forgive virtually everything. The Italian press was considerably less forgiving. Following the accident at Fuji in 1977, journalists mockingly nicknamed Gilles Villeneuve “the aviator” and directed fierce criticism at Ferrari for having recruited him.
At the opposite end of the spectrum stood Niki Lauda, cold and methodical, nicknamed “the computer” by the media and involved in a breakdown of relations with Italian journalists in Spain in 1976. Nevertheless, in a 1975 interview with l’Unità, Enzo Ferrari praised Niki Lauda for the seriousness and determination with which he worked alongside the engineers.
The real rule became apparent in 1979 with Jody Scheckter. After a race, the South African described the team as disorganised and confused in front of the press. Enzo Ferrari personally reprimanded him and even showed him the interview published in a magazine, contradicting the driver’s attempt to justify his remarks.
Personality, therefore, mattered relatively little. What mattered enormously was ensuring that nobody exposed the team’s weaknesses in public. In return, Enzo Ferrari retained exclusive control over Ferrari’s official voice and personally decided what information should become public. It was a habit that would have significant consequences in the years that followed.
Imola 1982: the Ferrari team order that both drivers interpreted differently
At Imola on 25 April 1982, the Ferrari pit wall displayed a board reading “Slow” to its two drivers. Almost everyone watching interpreted the instruction as a request to reduce their pace and maintain their positions. Gilles Villeneuve understood it in precisely that way, believing the priority was to protect the delicate turbocharged machinery. Didier Pironi, however, reached a different conclusion.
The two drivers exchanged the lead several times before Didier Pironi overtook his team-mate at Tosa on the final lap and claimed victory. According to historical reconstructions, even within Ferrari there were differing interpretations of what the instruction actually meant.
According to Piero Ferrari, a furious Gilles Villeneuve secured a meeting with Enzo Ferrari, who replied that he understood the driver’s feelings on a human level but pointed out that the Scuderia had achieved a one-two finish and could not reprimand Didier Pironi.
Renata Nosetto recounts an even more concise exchange. Enzo Ferrari asked who had finished first, and Gilles Villeneuve replied, “Pironi’s Ferrari.” When asked about second place, the Canadian answered, “A Ferrari.” Enzo Ferrari concluded, “Then that’s fine.”
Gilles Villeneuve declared that he would never speak to Didier Pironi again. Two weeks later, he died during qualifying for the Belgian Grand Prix. Meanwhile, throughout the summer of that year, the Italian press increasingly referred to Didier Pironi as “the accountant”.
The central problem was not the temperament of either driver, but an instruction too brief to be properly understood. The subsequent explanation came only behind closed doors, leaving Gilles Villeneuve alone with his anger.
Alain Prost, the truck comparison and a dismissal announced by Ferrari’s press office
Alain Prost made no attempt to conceal his dissatisfaction in 1991. After Imola, he criticised Ferrari’s management, arguing that certain people within the team were making decisions without being accountable to anyone. In Spain, he complained about the limited funding being allocated, while ahead of Suzuka he suggested that too many people were in charge at Maranello.
The remark that came to define the breakdown arrived at Suzuka on 20 October. Following the race, Alain Prost compared his Formula 1 car to a truck because it was so difficult to drive. Nine days later, on 29 October, Ferrari’s press office announced the immediate termination of his relationship with the team for 1991 and 1992.
Alain Prost learned the news from his lawyer while on holiday in Australia and complained that nobody from Maranello had contacted him directly. The following day, l’Unità portrayed him as an undisciplined and difficult driver, identifying the truck comparison as the final straw.
The sequence closely resembled what had happened to Jody Scheckter, with one significant difference. This time, public criticism was answered through an official statement and, according to Alain Prost himself, without even a telephone call. Ferrari’s press office delivered the message rather than the people who should have provided the explanation.
Fernando Alonso and Ferrari: team orders at Hockenheim and public criticism in Hungary
With Fernando Alonso, the same pattern returned in two distinct episodes. At Hockenheim in 2010, Felipe Massa’s race engineer informed the Brazilian over the radio that Fernando Alonso was faster than him. It was a coded message, after which Felipe Massa allowed his team-mate to pass.
The regulations at the time prohibited team orders, and Stefano Domenicali consequently denied that any such instruction had been issued. He maintained that Felipe Massa had simply been given information about the situation on track. Nevertheless, the stewards fined Ferrari $100,000.
In 2013, however, Fernando Alonso was the one who spoke too freely, at least from Maranello’s perspective. Following his fifth-place finish in Hungary, he was asked what birthday present he would like and replied that he wanted somebody else’s car. Asked about the summer break, he added that he would be praying.
On Monday 29 July, the day of Fernando Alonso’s 32nd birthday, Ferrari published an online statement calling for unity and warning against rash outbursts. During a birthday telephone call, Luca di Montezemolo reminded the Spaniard that the team’s champions had always placed Ferrari’s interests above their own. It was an unusually direct public reprimand.
The episodes of 2010 and 2013 illustrated two sides of the same approach. Decisions made by the team were communicated only partially, or not communicated at all, while the opinions expressed by its drivers were publicly corrected.
Sebastian Vettel and Charles Leclerc: the unwritten rules behind Brazil 2019
The 2019 season presented another test for Ferrari, this time involving Sebastian Vettel and Charles Leclerc. Following their collision in Brazil on 17 November, Mattia Binotto explained that the drivers had been free to race each other. Ferrari had already secured second place in the Constructors’ Championship, removing a major competitive consideration.
Four days later, on 21 November, John Elkann said he was extremely angry and reminded everyone that the only thing that mattered was Ferrari winning. Meanwhile, the team summoned both drivers to Maranello to explain what had happened and launched an internal investigation.
The weakness in Ferrari’s approach had emerged earlier. Mattia Binotto and the team’s senior management had still not established the rules of engagement between Sebastian Vettel and Charles Leclerc for the following season. The freedom granted on race day had therefore become a source of blame by the following Thursday.
Once again, an unspoken rule had contributed to an incident, and the incident had prompted a public reprimand from Ferrari’s president.
Lewis Hamilton and Ferrari’s communication problems return in 2026
In 2026, Ferrari has displayed the same vulnerability. At Zandvoort on 23 August, Fred Vasseur justified the team’s decision to withhold strategic information from Lewis Hamilton with the following explanation: “We didn’t want to reveal the strategy to Lewis at that moment because we didn’t want to reveal it to our rivals.”
The Ferrari team principal added that allowing Charles Leclerc to remain on track for an additional lap had created some confusion.
Lewis Hamilton compared the situation with his experience at Mercedes, where drivers receive a call and immediately carry out the instruction. After the race, the seven-time world champion apologised for the tone of his comments, acknowledging that they had not represented the best version of himself.
Fred Vasseur subsequently explained that Ferrari held a one-hour call with both drivers the following Monday to clarify the strategy and the reasoning behind it. The explanation eventually arrived, but only after the race rather than beforehand, when it would have been most useful.
At Monza on 6 September, the same dynamic resurfaced in a more serious form. Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc ran side by side into the first chicane, with Lewis Hamilton ending up in the gravel and eventually finishing sixth. Charles Leclerc retired following an accident.
Lewis Hamilton called for a review of Ferrari’s communication procedures, arguing that responsibility begins at the top. Fred Vasseur revealed that he had spoken to Lewis Hamilton for just two seconds and had not spoken to Charles Leclerc at all. He also considered it too early to designate a number-one driver.
The consequences of Ferrari’s internal difficulties have remained relevant during the growing tensions between Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc, particularly when questions arise over how the team should manage two highly competitive drivers.
Ultimately, Ferrari’s desire to prevent rivals from obtaining information can leave its own drivers making decisions without the full picture, only to be held accountable afterwards for what they have said or done.
John Elkann, Maria Conti and Fred Vasseur: who speaks for Ferrari today?
On 10 November 2025, following Ferrari’s disappointing performance in Brazil, John Elkann had urged the team’s drivers to concentrate on driving and talk less. On 23 November, Fred Vasseur offered a different perspective, saying he preferred drivers to be honest after a race. Within just 13 days, Ferrari had presented two noticeably different positions.
On 29 September 2026, amid speculation about Fred Vasseur’s future, it was Maria Conti, Ferrari’s head of communications, who spoke during a call with selected journalists. Fred Vasseur, John Elkann and Benedetto Vigna were all absent, while Maria Conti reiterated the team’s complete confidence in its team principal. It was an unusual move, particularly considering that the press conference had been arranged within approximately ten minutes.
At Singapore on 11 October, following Lance Stroll’s retirement and the subsequent Virtual Safety Car, Ferrari called both drivers into the pits for fresh soft tyres. Charles Leclerc followed the instruction, whereas Lewis Hamilton chose a different approach from the one recommended by the pit wall. He was eventually overtaken by Andrea Kimi Antonelli, Lando Norris and Oscar Piastri.
Fred Vasseur appeared visibly irritated when speaking to the media afterwards, explaining that Lewis Hamilton had not followed the team’s instruction. The British driver accepted full responsibility, first over the radio and subsequently on Instagram.
Responsibility for addressing controversies now increasingly falls to Ferrari’s organisational structures rather than directly to the principal figures involved. The communications department issues statements, the team principal addresses the media and the president delivers his own message.
Under Enzo Ferrari, there was one official voice. Today, several different voices speak for Maranello, and they do not always agree.
Ferrari’s controlled spontaneity and the cycle of driver criticism
The common thread linking these episodes is unmistakable. Ferrari has accommodated every type of personality, from the fearless Gilles Villeneuve to the methodical Niki Lauda, from the outspoken Alain Prost to the forthright Lewis Hamilton. The condition has consistently been that criticism should remain behind closed doors.
It is not simply a question of favouring one driver over another. John Elkann has publicly reprimanded both drivers, while Fred Vasseur has expressed his appreciation for honesty. Yet the underlying tensions continue to return.
These two tendencies also reinforce one another. The more tightly Ferrari controls its public messaging, the greater the potential for uncertainty within the team. A driver who does not know where the boundaries of confidentiality lie may reveal too much or make an independent decision, as Charles Leclerc did in Baku and Lewis Hamilton did in Singapore.
What follows is often a public reprimand, and the cycle begins again. The continuing challenge has become particularly visible in the response from Fred Vasseur to the Ferrari drivers’ clash in Mexico, where the management of two champions has once again raised questions about internal communication and mutual respect.
The wider relationship between the two drivers can also be followed through the Charles Leclerc and Lewis Hamilton head-to-head statistics, although the challenges facing Ferrari extend well beyond performance comparisons.
That is why the events of 8 October are so revealing. Two hours of spontaneity granted to Ferrari’s drivers, subsequently presented in an official statement as though they were an unauthorised takeover, neatly encapsulate the communication style of a team capable of controlling even its own chaos.
With the demand for further discussions following the Mexico Grand Prix controversy, the question of how Ferrari manages its drivers remains pressing.
The unanswered question is whether, before telling its drivers to remain silent, Ferrari can learn to explain clearly what they are actually allowed to say.
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