Ferrari’s Hungarian Grand Prix strategy was compromised by a fundamental weakness on the C3 Hard tyre, with Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc unable to reproduce the competitive pace shown by the SF-26 on the Soft compound. Tyre degradation had a much greater influence on the race than expected, creating a wide variety of strategies ranging from one to three pit stops and completely reshaping the order seen after the opening lap.
The 2026 Hungarian Grand Prix proved particularly interesting from a strategic perspective. A race influenced by degradation had been anticipated, but not to such an extent. Before the start, the two-stop strategy appeared likely to be the preferred option for most drivers, while a small number might have been able to complete the race competitively with only one stop. Few would have imagined that some drivers would stop three times.
Degradation had an enormous effect on the final outcome. At the end of the opening lap, Oscar Piastri led from Lando Norris, Max Verstappen, Lewis Hamilton, Charles Leclerc, Kimi Antonelli and Isack Hadjar. George Russell had fallen from sixth to 20th after a dreadful start. By the chequered flag, the Hungarian Grand Prix classification had been completely transformed.
Tyre degradation produces strategies from one to three stops
The most popular strategy was a two-stop Medium-Hard-Hard sequence, which Pirelli had identified on Saturday evening as potentially the best option for the race. Six drivers followed that route: Kimi Antonelli, Isack Hadjar, George Russell, Franco Colapinto, Esteban Ocon and Oliver Bearman.
Four drivers used all three compounds through a Medium-Hard-Soft strategy: Max Verstappen, Liam Lawson, Nico Hülkenberg and Alexander Albon. The two Aston Martin drivers adopted a Soft-Medium-Soft sequence, while Arvid Lindblad and Gabriel Bortoleto impressed by reaching the finish with only one pit stop. Arvid Lindblad even secured one point by finishing tenth.
Oscar Piastri retired for McLaren, while Sergio Pérez and Valtteri Bottas also failed to finish for Cadillac.
Ferrari’s C3 tyre weakness limits its Hungarian GP strategy
There were numerous mistakes during the race. Charles Leclerc failed to make the most of the Soft tyres at the start, while Lewis Hamilton collected another penalty after exceeding the pit-lane speed limit. Those, however, were individual episodes. The greater strategic question concerns what Ferrari could realistically have done differently from the pit wall.
The central problem that once again limited the Scuderia was its management of the C3 compound. Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc were competitive in the SF-26 on the C5 Soft, both at the beginning of the race and during the final stint. On the C3 Hard, however, the required pace was simply not there.
That dramatic change in performance between compounds was another example of the Ferrari inconsistency that puzzled Charles Leclerc after the race.
Lewis Hamilton provided the clearest demonstration. Unable to overtake Max Verstappen while running on Soft tyres, the Ferrari driver made his first pit stop early. The decision allowed Lewis Hamilton to gain the position through an excellent undercut, but Max Verstappen then completed an outstanding overtake. From that moment, it became virtually impossible for Ferrari to beat the Red Bull driver.
Ferrari had no further answer in terms of race pace. Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc fitted a second set of C3 tyres between laps 30 and 37, but the situation did not improve. Their pace returned to the level of Lando Norris and Kimi Antonelli only during the final laps, when the Virtual Safety Car allowed both Ferrari drivers to switch back to Soft tyres.
Competing under those conditions was extremely difficult. Ferrari had a problem that went beyond the timing of an individual pit stop or the decision to react to a rival’s strategy.
The aerodynamic configuration of the SF-26 may also have made recovering positions more difficult once the Ferrari drivers encountered traffic. The effects of the team’s high-downforce Hungarian GP rear wing were particularly significant when Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc needed straight-line performance to overtake.
Could Ferrari have avoided the Hard tyre?
It is difficult to establish what would have happened if Ferrari had used another set of Softs or Mediums instead of the Hard compound during one of its stints. Would the SF-26 have been slightly more competitive? Probably. Would either Lewis Hamilton or Charles Leclerc have reached the podium? That is much harder to determine.
One possible interpretation is that, after recognising that the C3 would once again prevent the team from challenging for victory, Ferrari decided to use both available sets on each car to collect data and gain a clearer understanding of the compound’s behaviour.
Ferrari will now have the summer break to analyse why the SF-26 struggled so severely on the Hard tyre and search for a better operating window. Solving the problem will be important before the championship resumes in the Netherlands and then moves to Monza, where Ferrari will hope to deliver a memorable weekend for its home supporters. The 2026 Dutch Grand Prix schedule provides the complete timetable for Formula 1’s return at Zandvoort.
Why Ferrari’s Virtual Safety Car decision was understandable
Differentiating the strategies during the late Virtual Safety Car period, as the drivers also suggested after the race, would not necessarily have made sense. With Oscar Piastri’s car stopped on the circuit, there was no guarantee that the Virtual Safety Car would not become a full Safety Car. Had that happened, leaving one driver out on Hard tyres could have delivered the final blow to Ferrari’s race.
With the SF-26 already lacking pace on the C3, extending those tyres by more than ten additional laps without stopping would also have been difficult for both Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc. Before placing all the blame on Ferrari’s strategic decisions, the team must address its performance on the Hard compound.
Until Ferrari solves that weakness, debating whether an individual strategy would have succeeded has limited value. The team subsequently acknowledged that its overall Hungarian Grand Prix tyre strategy was not the best available sequence, but its compound-specific performance remained the more fundamental concern.
The race ultimately became another missed opportunity in a weekend containing a combination of tyre difficulties, operational decisions and driver errors. A complete examination of the mistakes that left Ferrari outside the Hungaroring podium shows how those setbacks accumulated across the Grand Prix.
McLaren and Mercedes demonstrate their race pace
Lando Norris and Oscar Piastri immediately demonstrated that McLaren had superior pace to Ferrari and Red Bull. Both made perfect starts and the team executed a clean strategy. McLaren’s only major problem came through Oscar Piastri’s collision with the lapped Carlos Sainz and his subsequent retirement, which represented the sole blemish on the team’s weekend.
Mercedes, particularly through Kimi Antonelli, also showed impressive speed. The Italian driver’s principal difficulty was starting further down the order at a circuit where overtaking is extremely challenging.
The clearest evidence of Kimi Antonelli’s pace came in the final stint. Despite running on the C3 Hard tyre, he managed to keep Lewis Hamilton behind while the Ferrari driver was using the softer and theoretically faster C5 compound.
George Russell recovered through a two-stop strategy and made good use of the performance available from the W17. After getting the start completely wrong and falling to the rear of the field, the Mercedes driver at least achieved the minimum expected result by overtaking all the lower and midfield cars before finishing behind Isack Hadjar.
Pirelli: Ferrari strongest on Softs and Mercedes on Hards
After the race, in which the reigning world champion secured his first victory of the season, Pirelli motorsport director Dario Marrafuschi highlighted the breadth of tyre strategies employed at the Hungaroring.
“We saw a great variety of strategies,” Dario Marrafuschi said. “All the teams were able to make use of the entire range of compounds available to them. Each team identified the most effective combination for maximising the characteristics of its car.”
“Through development, we wanted to create a range capable of adapting as effectively as possible even to cars that have followed different development paths. The teams used the C5 in different ways, and this year it has confirmed itself as a genuine race option rather than only a qualifying tyre.”
“We saw stints of more than 29 laps on the Soft tyre, with five drivers managing to do that. In the end, the race was contested with strategies ranging from one to three stops. Among the leading teams, only Ferrari chose to start on the Soft. By calling Lewis Hamilton into the pits at the first available opportunity, it effectively triggered the entire sequence of pit stops among its rivals. That solution offered greater flexibility,” the Italian manager continued.
Dario Marrafuschi then underlined the contrasting tyre strengths demonstrated by Ferrari and Mercedes during the race.
“While Ferrari showed particular effectiveness when using the Soft, Mercedes instead appeared to focus heavily on the Hard. The teams made their decisions under the Virtual Safety Car. Degradation was in line with expectations despite the high temperatures, with the asphalt averaging around 50°C.”
“The drivers mainly had to manage the rear tyres, which were the principal limiting factor for traction. This did not compromise the race pace, also thanks to the circuit’s constant evolution throughout the event.”
Pirelli’s assessment reinforced the central conclusion from Ferrari’s race: the SF-26 could operate effectively on the C5 Soft, but its performance dropped away on the C3 Hard. Until the Maranello team understands why that compound created such a significant loss of pace, strategic flexibility alone may not be enough to fight consistently for victories and podiums.
Lewis Hamilton’s afternoon was further complicated by a five-second sanction for exceeding the pit-lane speed limit by only 0.1 km/h. The full FIA decision and its effect on the classification are explained in the report on Lewis Hamilton’s Hungarian GP penalty.
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