Ferrari’s difficulties in the 2026 Formula 1 season cannot be explained by its power unit alone. While the engine deficit has become a central topic under the new regulations, Red Bull’s recovery and two consecutive victories have exposed a more uncomfortable question for Maranello: why has a team with decades of technical experience and considerable resources struggled to turn its entire project into a consistently winning package?
For years, discussions surrounding Ferrari’s Formula 1 problems have tended to focus on one component at a time. First it was the chassis, then the suspension, followed by aerodynamic balance and tyre management. With the arrival of the 2026 regulations, attention has shifted towards the engine. However, the comparison with Red Bull suggests that searching for a single explanation risks overlooking the bigger issue: the effectiveness of Ferrari’s entire technical organisation.
The challenge involves interpreting regulations, making the right development decisions, integrating the chassis and power unit, and improving the car throughout the season. Red Bull has confronted similar difficulties while establishing its own power-unit operation in partnership with Ford and managing the departures of several prominent technical and management figures. Despite a difficult start to 2026, the Milton Keynes team has recovered sufficiently to win two consecutive Grands Prix.
Ferrari, meanwhile, must explain why its established engineering structure has not extracted the expected potential from the SF-26. The question is no longer simply why its internal combustion engine is less competitive, but why the complete project has failed to establish a sufficient advantage over its rivals.
Ferrari vs Red Bull Ford: the 2026 engine comparison raises difficult questions
The most significant starting point is the power unit. Ferrari has been developing racing engines for decades, drawing on extensive technical knowledge, established facilities and experience accumulated across numerous Formula 1 regulatory cycles. Red Bull, by contrast, created its own power-unit division and entered a technical partnership with Ford to prepare for the introduction of the sport’s new engine regulations.
That does not mean Red Bull approached the project without expertise. The team recruited experienced specialists, built dedicated facilities and began preparing well before the regulations took effect. Nevertheless, becoming a power-unit manufacturer in 2026 represented a major step beyond its previous position as a customer of an external engine supplier.
The significance of that investment has become increasingly apparent. Through its Additional Development and Upgrade Opportunities system, known as ADUO, the FIA identified the Red Bull-Ford internal combustion engine as the performance benchmark in the first two assessment windows of 2026.
In the opening assessment, Ferrari, Audi and Honda were placed in the category with a deficit exceeding four per cent, making them eligible for two additional development homologation opportunities. The second assessment did not produce any further opportunities for any manufacturer. The implications of the system, including the competitive position of the different engine suppliers, have also been examined in the context of Red Bull’s position under the FIA’s ADUO regulations.
These results require careful interpretation. ADUO assesses the performance of the internal combustion engine, rather than the complete power unit or the overall competitiveness of the car. Electrical deployment, aerodynamic efficiency and chassis performance are separate elements of the broader competitive equation. Nevertheless, the assessment establishes an important distinction: according to the FIA’s methodology, Red Bull has produced an internal combustion engine that leads its competitors.
For Ferrari, that represents a significant warning. It is not enough to attribute the situation to an unsuccessful technical concept. Any manufacturer can choose a development direction that ultimately proves less effective, particularly when regulations change substantially. However, an experienced organisation must also be judged on the processes through which it identifies solutions, compares alternatives and evaluates results.
The central issue is not simply that Ferrari may have made a mistake. It is understanding why that mistake occurred, whether it could reasonably have been anticipated, and what mechanisms existed within the organisation to reduce the risk.
Why Ferrari’s 2026 problems may be structural rather than purely technical
The power unit represents only one part of the problem. In modern Formula 1, no major component can be evaluated entirely independently of the rest of the car. The engine interacts with the chassis, aerodynamic package, cooling system and energy-management strategy. Decisions taken in one area can affect the effectiveness of another, making coordination between engineering departments essential.
An engine deficit can compromise straight-line performance, but it does not automatically explain every cornering weakness, balance problem, tyre-management limitation or upgrade that fails to deliver the expected gain.
That is why the discussion must extend beyond engine output and towards the overall quality of Ferrari’s technical project. If the SF-26 cannot maintain consistent competitiveness, the evaluation must also consider aerodynamic efficiency, the ability to generate downforce without excessive drag, floor behaviour and the correlation between simulation tools, wind-tunnel results and actual track performance.
Ferrari’s development challenges are closely connected to these considerations. The team’s Singapore Grand Prix technical analysis highlighted the importance of rear grip and the wider relationship between car behaviour and race performance.
This does not mean every individual engineering decision made at Maranello has necessarily been incorrect. Rather, a Formula 1 car is the product of a system of interconnected decisions, and the results of that system must be assessed collectively.
When difficulties arise across different components and regulatory periods, it becomes reasonable to question whether the underlying problem is deeper than one unsuccessful technical solution. The greater concern is the possibility that an organisation with extensive resources is failing to convert those advantages into sustained competitive performance.
Does Ferrari really have a chassis advantage over Red Bull?
For part of the season, Ferrari’s chassis and aerodynamic performance were presented as strengths capable of compensating for limitations elsewhere in the SF-26. The argument was relatively straightforward: with a more powerful engine, Ferrari might be able to demonstrate considerably greater competitiveness.
However, that interpretation also needs to be tested against evidence.
Downforce alone does not determine the quality of a Formula 1 car. Aerodynamic drag, load distribution, balance through different cornering phases, traction and the ability to maintain performance over a race distance are equally important considerations.
Nor can a reliable comparison between two chassis be established from visual impressions or performance in a single sector. Demonstrating a genuine chassis advantage requires comparable data, long-run analysis, cornering behaviour and consistent evidence across circuits with different characteristics.
The results of the last two Grands Prix have made the assumption of Ferrari’s overall superiority increasingly difficult to sustain.
In Malaysia, Max Verstappen won for Red Bull, while Lewis Hamilton finished third and Charles Leclerc fourth for Ferrari. The following race in Singapore produced another victory for Max Verstappen, with Charles Leclerc securing second place and Lewis Hamilton finishing sixth.
These results do not, by themselves, prove that Red Bull has an inherently superior chassis in every condition. Charles Leclerc’s second place in Singapore, for example, demonstrated that Ferrari remained capable of competing near the front. Nevertheless, consecutive victories show that Red Bull’s complete package has become highly competitive.
Ferrari must therefore move beyond simplified explanations. An engine disadvantage should not automatically be used to establish that every other component of the SF-26 is performing exceptionally well.
If Ferrari possesses a chassis advantage, that advantage needs to be demonstrated. If Red Bull has also made progress in aerodynamic and vehicle-dynamics performance, Maranello must acknowledge that its rival has developed effective solutions across several areas.
A presumed chassis advantage cannot become another permanent justification for disappointing results. Comparing Ferrari’s Austin development plans and Charles Leclerc’s concerns about losing ground illustrates why the team must continue improving the SF-26 rather than relying on assumptions about its existing strengths.
Red Bull recovered after losing Adrian Newey and Christian Horner
The organisational comparison is equally important. Red Bull has experienced major changes involving several of the people who helped establish its competitive position.
Adrian Newey, one of the most influential figures in the team’s car design history, departed, as did Christian Horner, who had served as team principal for a substantial period of Red Bull’s Formula 1 involvement. Other prominent departures included Rob Marshall, Jonathan Wheatley and Will Courtenay, alongside further changes to the technical organisation.
The restructuring was not painless, and it would be inaccurate to suggest Red Bull experienced no difficulties. The opening phase of the 2026 season exposed weaknesses, while its newly established power-unit operation still had to demonstrate its competitive potential.
The difference is that Red Bull continued developing its organisation, redefining responsibilities and integrating the expertise of new personnel into the existing structure.
Under the leadership of Laurent Mekies, the team progressively recovered competitiveness. Its victories in Malaysia and Singapore represent tangible evidence of that progress, although two successful races do not establish that every weakness has been eliminated.
That distinction makes the comparison with Ferrari particularly revealing.
Maranello also requires stability, continuity and sufficient time to develop an effective technical structure. However, those requirements cannot become explanations that remain valid regardless of the results achieved.
If a team facing the simultaneous challenges of developing a new power unit, adapting to major technical regulations and managing substantial organisational changes can recover during the same season, questions about the relative effectiveness of the two organisations become unavoidable.
The issue is not simply financial resources or historical prestige. It is the ability to execute a development programme effectively and turn technical work into measurable improvements on the circuit.
From suspension problems to engine performance: why Ferrari keeps facing new questions
One of the most frustrating aspects of the debate surrounding Ferrari is the recurring search for a different technical explanation whenever the team fails to meet expectations.
In previous seasons, discussions focused heavily on suspension design, the ability to keep the car within its preferred aerodynamic operating window and the compromises required to exploit the downforce generated by the floor. The arrival of the 2026 regulations has shifted attention towards Ferrari’s power-unit concept.
It is essential to distinguish documented technical assessments from interpretations and speculation circulating within the paddock. Not every explanation associated with Ferrari represents an official position from the team, and not every performance limitation can be attributed to a single design decision.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern remains. When a season falls short of expectations, the discussion often becomes concentrated on the particular mistake believed to have compromised the result.
The danger is that identifying another technical weakness can overshadow the broader question of responsibility for the overall project.
An ineffective suspension concept, an aerodynamic solution that fails to work as intended or a power unit that lacks performance are not necessarily unavoidable events beyond an organisation’s control. They are engineering risks that must be assessed, understood and managed.
No engineer can guarantee that every technical choice will deliver the desired result. A successful development organisation must, however, be capable of evaluating alternatives, recognising unsuccessful decisions and correcting them efficiently.
That shifts the question away from identifying one individual responsible for a particular mistake. The more important consideration is whether Ferrari possesses the structure, leadership and decision-making processes needed to prevent different technical problems from repeatedly producing the same outcome: a car that falls short of genuine championship-winning competitiveness.
Why restructuring and patience cannot become permanent explanations
Organisational restructuring is frequently cited when a Formula 1 team struggles to achieve its objectives. There is a legitimate basis for this argument. Changing working processes, integrating new specialists and establishing effective communication between departments takes time.
However, time is not an unlimited resource, and it cannot provide a sufficient explanation for every disappointing campaign.
Ferrari needs to demonstrate that its engineering work is producing measurable improvements. Updates must deliver the expected benefits, development choices must remain aligned with clearly defined objectives, and technical limitations must be addressed without forcing the organisation to begin the process again with each new problem.
The comparison with Red Bull makes this requirement particularly clear. Despite major departures and the challenge of creating a new engine operation, the Milton Keynes team has managed to achieve high-level results during the same season.
This does not mean Red Bull’s organisational model is free from problems, or that Ferrari could reproduce it automatically. It demonstrates that responding effectively to setbacks is a fundamental part of modern Formula 1 competitiveness.
Ferrari cannot depend indefinitely on the prestige of its history, the scale of its resources or promises surrounding the next technical upgrade to maintain confidence in its direction.
Ultimately, that confidence must be supported by results.
Ferrari remain second in the 2026 standings, but Red Bull’s recovery is significant
The Constructors’ Championship provides an important distinction. Ahead of the United States Grand Prix, Ferrari sit second with 444 points, while Red Bull occupy fourth place with 332. The Scuderia therefore hold a 112-point advantage over their rival in the season-long standings.
It would be misleading to suggest that Red Bull have already overtaken Ferrari in the championship. Nevertheless, the results of the last two Grands Prix indicate a trend that the Italian team cannot afford to ignore.
Max Verstappen has claimed two consecutive victories, demonstrating that Red Bull have made substantial progress in transforming their car into a competitive race-winning package.
There are therefore two distinct ways to interpret the situation.
The first concerns the results accumulated across the entire season, where Ferrari maintain a substantial advantage. The second concerns the level of performance demonstrated in recent races, where Red Bull have shown that they can challenge for victory.
It is this second consideration that makes the situation particularly concerning for Maranello.
The championship table does not erase underlying technical limitations or guarantee that Ferrari will maintain their advantage. Equally, two victories cannot demonstrate conclusively that Red Bull have eliminated every weakness.
What matters is the direction of development. Red Bull are increasingly converting technical progress into competitive results, while Ferrari must demonstrate the same effectiveness.
That response needs to be visible on the circuit rather than expressed through another explanation of why the SF-26 has not met expectations. The remaining development programme, including the aerodynamic changes prepared for Austin, will provide further evidence of whether Ferrari can translate engineering work into consistent gains.
Ferrari’s 2026 F1 project must answer questions beyond engine power
Comparing Ferrari with Red Bull does not mean dismissing the Italian manufacturer’s engineering history or claiming that every technical decision taken at Maranello has been incorrect. Instead, it highlights a contradiction that is becoming increasingly difficult to overlook.
On one side is a manufacturer with decades of experience in designing Formula 1 power units, an established engineering structure and the ambition to compete for championships. On the other is a team that entered 2026 as a new power-unit manufacturer, working with Ford while simultaneously managing a substantial organisational restructuring.
Red Bull have demonstrated that they can develop a competitive internal combustion engine and improve their car sufficiently to win two consecutive Grands Prix. Ferrari, meanwhile, have yet to establish that their complete project can compete consistently at the highest level.
The issue cannot therefore be reduced to engine output alone.
If the supposed chassis advantage cannot be demonstrated convincingly, if updates fail to deliver the expected performance gains and if every difficulty is explained through another isolated technical weakness, the evaluation must become broader.
Responsibility does not necessarily belong to one person or department. It concerns how the organisation makes decisions, coordinates its technical expertise and verifies whether its development work is producing the desired results.
Ferrari are entitled to make engineering mistakes. What the team cannot afford is to treat every unsuccessful decision as an unavoidable misfortune or assume that its historical achievements guarantee future success.
Red Bull have shown that even a major industrial and technical challenge can deliver results within a relatively short period. Ferrari must now demonstrate that they can achieve comparable progress using the experience, expertise and facilities already available at Maranello.
The fundamental failure would not be designing an unsuccessful engine or choosing the wrong suspension concept. It would be failing to learn from those decisions and transform the lessons into a winning Formula 1 project.
For Ferrari, the answer cannot come from another justification. It has to come from the track.
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