F1 aerodynamic designs: regulatory constraints leading to technical convergence

The return of ground-effect cars in 2022 marked the beginning of a new era in Formula 1, representing the most significant regulatory change in the history of top-tier motorsport. It essentially compelled teams’ engineers to start from scratch and design the current wing cars. While the fundamental aerodynamic concepts of ground effect were not new, having been explored by Colin Chapman in the 1970s, engineers embarked on remarkably different paths, leading to a diverse grid in terms of aerodynamic philosophies, particularly among the three top teams.

In fact, Ferrari, Mercedes, and Red Bull initially introduced three vastly different car designs in Bahrain, differing in shapes and dimensions. However, after a year and a half on the track, the current grid of cars is becoming increasingly similar, with all converging on the same aerodynamic approaches. This makes the cars distinguishable only by specific details and, of course, their different power units. So, what has led to this convergence of solutions?

Undoubtedly, Formula 1 naturally tends to take inspiration from those who have executed their work excellently. This is a fundamental aspect of the sport. Additionally, it appears that the existing regulatory framework offers a singular path to unlock specific levels of competitiveness. However, there might be other factors contributing to this “ideological monotony.” Let’s explore them together.

F1, Wing Cars: The Technical Chronology of the Singular Setup
In March 2022, ground-effect cars were introduced, initially featuring three primary design philosophies. Ferrari unveiled the so-called “fish tanks,” which were essentially underfloor venturis designed to extract hot air from inside the car and channel it towards the rear. This concept seemed promising but quickly proved to be unviable in terms of performance potential within a few months.

Mercedes took a bolder approach, presenting a car with a “slim” design, known as the “zero pod” project, which was undeniably the most ambitious and daring route. However, despite the promising theoretical results, the W13 turned out to be a technical disaster on the track. The car lacked rear downforce while being excessively sensitive to “porpoising” (oscillations in ride height).

Then there’s the Red Bull RB18, designed by aerodynamics wizard Adrian Newey. Right from the first race of the previous season, the RB18 featured sloping sidepods gently guiding the airflow towards the rear of the car. The Milton Keynes-based car was unparalleled in terms of aerodynamic efficiency and top speed.

The astonishing outcome of this evolution was that, with each passing Grand Prix, the Austrian team achieved a technical equilibrium that made them unbeatable from the Brazilian Grand Prix in 2022 until September of the current year. This was when Carlos Sainz interrupted their dominant run, marking the only victory of the year for the underperforming Ferrari SF-23.

Such a clear-cut dominance couldn’t help but convince every engineer in the paddock that this was the way to go. In the 2023 competitive season, it was apparent that every team had invested time and resources in adopting the technical approach developed by the genius from Stratford-upon-Avon. Aston Martin was the first to adapt, introducing a significant update in Barcelona in 2022 by incorporating the sloping sidepods akin to Red Bull’s.

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Subsequently, Alpine and Williams introduced similar updates at Silverstone. The British team didn’t hesitate to deviate from the “zero pod” concept provided by their engine supplier, Mercedes. As the races unfolded, McLaren made significant alterations in what has now become the key aerodynamic zone of ground-effect cars, mimicking the RB19’s sidepods. As the current world championship began, even teams like Alfa Romeo, which adopted Adrian Newey’s winning ideas, and others, such as Ferrari and Mercedes, initially adhered to their own design philosophies, hoping they could make them work and bridge the gap to the exceptional Red Bull.

However, eight World Championship rounds later, these teams also aligned with the rest of the grid, introducing ad-hoc, temporary solutions, which serve as precursors to what we are likely to see next year. With the substantial upgrade package that Haas brought to Austin, the last team to distinguish itself from the majority finally adopted more conventional concepts, moving away from the once-famous Formula 1-75 style fish tanks.

F1, Wing Cars: When Rules Lead to a Specific Setup
This was certainly not the intention of the regulations concerning ground-effect cars. The regulatory framework was built upon well-defined volumes within which teams enjoyed absolute freedom to design as they saw fit. The only constraints related to dimensions, space, and structural resistance for safety reasons. Despite this, the vast majority of designers decided to look around rather than remain fixed at their drawing boards. And how could you blame them?

Copying in Formula 1 is a practice as old as the sport itself. Learning from those who win is common practice, and teams have taken turns over the years, setting the standard for the rest of the grid. The present time marks the golden era of Red Bull, boasting a world-renowned technical team where everyone at the Milton Keynes factory is encouraged to perform at their best. However, it would be reductionist to claim that the 2023 cars are becoming increasingly similar solely due to this aspect.

First and foremost, copying entails a close examination of the technologies because, according to the regulations, the transfer of technical information is theoretically prohibited. In this regard, all teams employ “spy photographers,” but there is a practical limit to capturing the secrets of others, as stationary cars can only be observed after qualifying and races. Additionally, it requires a deep understanding of how various components function and a considerable ability to adapt the learned concepts to one’s own car. These processes take months.

Another, less speculative and more technical argument involves technical directives issued during the season, which inadvertently influenced development. One such directive is TD039 from July of last year. In essence, it stipulated that those teams exceeding a specified maximum threshold for aerodynamic oscillations related to porpoising were effectively required to raise their cars. This led many teams, including Ferrari, to reconsider their design and attempt to make their cars as insensitive as possible to variations in ride height.

The RB18, in addition to its on-track dominance, suffered less from aerodynamic oscillations than its rivals. It gradually became evident that the Austrian car featured a floor capable of functioning at various ride heights. It’s logical, therefore, to assume that many teams sought to put themselves in a similar position, even if it meant reengineering their entire aerodynamic package. Lastly, there is another aspect worthy of a special mention, linked to the various hypotheses put forward in this article: the budget cap.

The cost cap imposed by the International Federation forced teams to minimize their efforts while maximizing their effects. This inevitably influenced all aspects of Formula 1 car development. Consequently, teams have increasingly chosen the less risky and more rewarding route, which, in 99.9% of cases, corresponds to copying what is currently dominating the sport. It was only a matter of time, for instance, before Mercedes decided to abandon its own concept and return to well-established designs. The same goes for Ferrari.

While the financial regulations ensured the survival of smaller teams like Haas and Williams, they also constrained the imaginative freedom of engineers, forcing them into a dull and monotonous cycle of copying and pasting. Perhaps this is the real reason why we are gradually heading toward a Formula 1 that is homogenized, at least from a chassis-aerodynamics perspective. In anticipation of the 2026 revolution, we can expect a couple of seasons with cars that are tediously similar.