
Mattia Binotto’s Audi-Ferrari comparison has created a striking contradiction. After previously dismissing Maranello as a suitable model for the German manufacturer’s Formula 1 project, the former Ferrari team principal has now used the Scuderia of 1995 as a reference point for the scale of Audi’s current rebuilding task.
Sport has always produced divisive figures capable of splitting public opinion over their abilities, and Formula 1 is no exception. Mattia Binotto certainly belongs in that category. After spending decades at Ferrari as an engineer, technical director and ultimately team principal, the Lausanne-born executive has returned to Formula 1 in charge of the Audi project.
Mattia Binotto’s complicated Ferrari legacy
Audi’s decision to entrust Binotto with such an important programme demonstrates the status the German manufacturer believes he possesses. That recognition remains significant even though his period in charge of Ferrari is unlikely to be remembered as one of the most successful chapters in the team’s history.
His departure was officially presented as a resignation when it was announced on 29 November 2022. Behind that formal description, however, was effectively a decision by Ferrari’s senior management to remove him from the positions he had occupied since 2019. The episode appears to remain a painful part of Binotto’s relationship with the Maranello team.
Binotto rejected Ferrari as a model for Audi
During an interview with L’Équipe in March, the former head of Ferrari’s Gestione Sportiva was asked whether Maranello represented the model he intended to follow in order to lead Audi towards victory. Binotto delivered an emphatic, if somewhat disjointed, response.
“Why should I do that? They haven’t won anything since 2008. I want Audi to win,” Binotto replied when discussing why he did not want to copy modern Ferrari.
Ferrari’s championship drought is impossible to ignore. The complication is that Binotto himself played an important role during a large part of this prolonged period without a Formula 1 title. The current wait also risks exceeding the drought between Jody Scheckter’s 1979 Drivers’ Championship and Michael Schumacher’s long-awaited triumph at Suzuka in 2000.
Audi’s Formula 1 operation is spread across three centres
Audi has approached its first Formula 1 season with dignity despite entering the championship at the same time as one of the most extensive technical revolutions in the category’s history. Building a competitive operation remains an extremely complex task, particularly because the four-ring manufacturer’s programme is distributed across three separate technological centres:
- Hinwil: Sauber’s historic headquarters, now converted into the principal operational and design base for chassis work and single-seater development.
- Neuburg an der Donau: the facility dedicated entirely to designing, manufacturing and developing Audi’s hybrid power unit.
- Bicester: a British technology hub positioned to attract leading engineering talent and develop relationships with major specialists across Formula 1’s supply chain.
The creation of the Audi technology centre in the United Kingdom illustrates the manufacturer’s determination to expand beyond Hinwil and improve its access to Britain’s extensive motorsport expertise.
Why Mattia Binotto now compares Audi with Ferrari in 1995
In a more recent interview with RacingNews365, the Italian-Swiss executive acknowledged that the gap between Audi and Formula 1’s leading teams is largely the product of a major difference in infrastructure. The current limitations are a legacy of Sauber’s recent past, when the organisation operated with considerably more modest ambitions.
Binotto explained that Audi must increase its workforce and evaluate plans to expand its facilities. In his assessment, the German team’s present condition is remarkably similar to that of Ferrari in 1995, a comparison he used to illustrate the scale of Audi’s infrastructure challenge.
Ferrari launched an extensive reorganisation programme during that period. Following John Barnard’s unsuccessful return, the Italian team began centralising its major processes at the Maranello factory rather than continuing with a more fragmented technical structure.
From the following season, the Scuderia also began one of the most significant technical recruitment drives seen between Formula 1 teams. Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne were among the most prominent figures to follow Michael Schumacher from Benetton after the trio had achieved championship success together.
Those appointments ultimately became part of the foundation for Ferrari’s dominant era. The process began with Michael Schumacher’s landmark agreement to join Ferrari, before Brawn and Byrne added the technical leadership required to transform the organisation.
Why the Ferrari comparison does not fully hold up
Even with that historical context, Binotto’s comparison remains difficult to accept without qualification. Ferrari was not ready to challenge for the championship in 1995, but the team remained capable of competing for individual victories on several occasions despite not having the strongest driver available and continuing to suffer serious reliability problems.
Jean Alesi claimed a fortunate victory at the Canadian Grand Prix, but the Ferrari 412T2 could realistically have won other races during the season. The car therefore represented a level of immediate competitiveness that Audi may struggle to approach for several more years.
There is no contradiction in Binotto drawing lessons from his long experience at Maranello while attempting to build Audi into a successful Formula 1 operation. The inconsistency instead lies in the way Ferrari is rejected as a model when discussing success, only to be invoked when its difficult periods provide a convenient comparison.
If Ferrari cannot be considered a model for winning, why should its past be used—improperly—as Audi’s model for defeat?







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