The curtain is falling on two regulatory cycles: the ground effect cars introduced in 2022 and the era of the power units that date back to 2014. Both phases delivered several positive outcomes, but they also came with side effects from which important lessons can be learned for the future. The same applies to the new mechanisms introduced in the sporting regulations, which have generally been welcomed but at the same time require some corrections in order not to excessively limit the work of the teams.
Objectives only partially achieved
The main objective set by the FIA with the ground effect regulations was to reduce the loss of aerodynamic downforce for the following cars, with the aim of encouraging closer racing. Although an improvement compared to the past was initially observed, it cannot be said that this effect was maintained over time, as the situation gradually worsened. As a result, the overall assessment cannot be fully positive, but it is precisely from this partial failure that valuable lessons for the future can be drawn.
The most important lesson is that writing regulations with the aim of minimising aerodynamic disturbance is a necessary but not sufficient condition, as it requires continuous intervention over the years. The FIA and the teams, in fact, have conflicting interests: the former aims to restrict the wake produced by the cars, while the latter are constantly working to protect the floor from turbulence, pushing it outwards. Over the course of the seasons, it is therefore inevitable that machining processes and vortex generators multiply on the cars, and without intervention from the Federation, this ends up moving the regulations away from their original intentions.
However, ground effect cars have also shown that the frequency of on-track battles does not depend solely on aerodynamics. Data collected in 2025 from Pitot sensors on the nose cones indicated that the quality of the airflow directed towards the following cars was still better than in 2021, prompting an explanation of overtaking difficulties through other factors as well. Among these was the development by Pirelli of tyres that were mechanically and thermally more robust. Their reduced degradation slowed the creation of those performance gaps during a race that are fundamental to attacking the car ahead. As a result, a popular myth collapsed, namely the idea that the absence of management and the ability to push flat out at all times are a guaranteed source of spectacle.
Pros and cons
If, on the one hand, the 2022 regulations did not fully achieve the objective of promoting overtaking, on the other hand they exceeded expectations in terms of technical diversity. On the eve of their introduction, there were fears that the constraints would be too restrictive for designers. Instead, a wide range of different solutions emerged which, despite a general convergence, continued until the final year, especially regarding the dualism between push-rod and pull-rod suspension layouts. On the downside, the need to run the cars low and stiff was repeatedly criticised by the drivers, both because of the stress on their backs and due to a reduced driving enjoyment. The biggest mistake by both the FIA and the teams, however, remains the failure to anticipate porpoising, compounded by not taking a step back to allow the use of inerters in the suspension systems, which had been banned at the end of 2021.
Ground effect cars also proved to be extremely sensitive to external factors such as temperature, humidity, wind, tyre compounds and tyre pressures, leading to unpredictable and sometimes inexplicable swings in competitiveness, even for the teams themselves. The spectacle that resulted generated mixed feelings, because while surprise results were not lacking, understanding what was happening on track sometimes became overly complex. All of this was itself a consequence of an unprecedented level of performance convergence in Formula 1, with pole positions consistently decided by hundredths of a second, whereas in the past differences of several tenths were common. This was perhaps the greatest achievement of the ground effect cars, although the causes were not purely technical.
Sporting innovations
The 2022 cycle was the first to unfold entirely under the influence of the new mechanisms introduced into the sporting regulations at the start of the decade. Among these was the aerodynamic handicap system, with the allocation of wind tunnel and CFD analysis hours being inversely proportional to a team’s position in the constructors’ championship. This system reflects the intention to encourage performance convergence not by slowing down those who have done the best job, but by putting those who are chasing in a position to recover. This is a principle that will also be applied to engines from 2026, with the introduction of the ADUO.
Even more significant was the introduction of the budget cap. Establishing a spending limit was a true lifeline in the face of the growing gap between the front-running teams and those at the back of the grid, with some teams close to bankruptcy and the risk of Ferrari and Mercedes becoming the only power unit suppliers in 2026. At the same time, the explosion in Formula 1’s global popularity ensured increased revenues and partnerships, particularly for smaller teams, providing new funds to reinvest in order to close the infrastructural gap to the leading teams.
The usual Red Bull, Mercedes and Ferrari teams emerged as winners, with the welcome return of McLaren, but the prospects of others joining them in the future are encouraging. The budget cap, however, has also proven to be an obstacle to convergence, as a team that is behind, but has the same amount of money to spend as those ahead, will struggle to catch up both in terms of car performance and infrastructure. The hope for the future is therefore a loosening of the restrictions, at least when it comes to wind tunnel development and engine dyno testing.
A decade-long era
On track, the level of convergence became so high that it raised the question of whether it was really necessary to change everything for 2026. Doing something for the engines was necessary, also in response to Honda’s exit, which would have been followed by Renault’s departure, but perhaps it was not essential to revolutionise the power units to such an extent that the cars themselves had to be completely redesigned. In any case, the era of the 2014 power units has now come to an end. Initially heavily criticised, especially for a sound that could not be compared to naturally aspirated V8 or V10 engines, they proved their worth over time.
The dual electric motor power units were technically fascinating, true engineering masterpieces that struck an extraordinary balance between performance and reliability, staying true to Formula 1’s identity as the technological pinnacle of motorsport. Particularly impressive was the achievement of a thermal efficiency of 50%, compared to 35% for the previous generation. This was made possible by the introduction of the fuel flow limit, which it is pleasing to note will remain a cornerstone of the next regulatory cycle as well.
The 2014 regulations represented an unprecedented challenge, ushering Formula 1 into the hybrid era. Engine manufacturers were required to develop systems that did not exist anywhere else in the world, above all the MGU-H, an electric motor producing more than 60 kW and operating at 100,000 rpm, whose costs nevertheless limited its adoption in road car production. This is another lesson for the future, where priorities will include ensuring economic sustainability while also preventing dominations on the scale of Mercedes’ early-cycle supremacy. What matters most, however, is that measures aimed at promoting convergence do not turn into excessive interventionism, which would ultimately hinder a technological competition that remains an integral part of Formula 1.
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