The ground-effect regulations introduced between 2022 and 2025 were supposed to revolutionise the on-track spectacle. Instead, between porpoising, the return of outwash and slow governance, Formula 1 found itself fighting many of the same problems it was trying to solve.
A regulation born well, but allowed to slip away
The 2022–25 ground-effect rules did not work as expected, partly because the FIA did not react quickly enough to correct what was not working. Improving the ability of cars to follow each other was an ambitious and complex goal and, despite the huge amount of research carried out by Formula 1 and the FIA, the limits of the regulations emerged very early on.
The introduction of ground-effect floors was intended to make the cars aerodynamically more stable, while restrictions on outwash-generating components were a step in the right direction. However, no one had foreseen that the cars would be pushed to run so low that the edges of the floor would become critically important.
Porpoising was the first major warning sign: violent oscillations, drivers concerned about their spines, and a problem that was only partially mitigated through changes to the floor edges.
The cars continued to run extremely low, but teams began to generate sealing side vortices to improve floor performance, effectively working around the spirit of the rules.
Inevitably, outwash also returned. The FIA should have intervened on solutions such as vortices along the edges of the floor, slots in the front wing endplates and the complex aerodynamic geometries around the brakes, but nothing was ever truly stopped.
Slow governance, teams too fast: Formula 1’s unresolved issue
In 2022 the cars were able to follow each other more closely, but as downforce levels increased the situation worsened, until by 2025 races had become increasingly processional and dominated by DRS trains. Even the 2023 changes to the endplates failed to solve the issue: teams simply found new ways to achieve the same effect.
The FIA argues that governance processes prevented more decisive intervention, and this is true. However, if Formula 1 genuinely wants to improve the spectacle, it cannot allow bureaucracy to take precedence over technical necessity.
Teams will always act in their own interests; those who write the rules must have the authority to enforce them.
Useful changes could have been introduced in 2024 or 2025, but the system did not allow it. This is the usual battle between the regulator and commercial interests, and today those who control Formula 1 appear more focused on everything except the racing itself.
By the end of 2025, following another car was still easier than it had been in 2021, but not by enough. The grid did become more compact, yes, but also because the regulations became so restrictive that they came close to resembling a one-make formula.
The cost cap adds further complexity: rather than being a clear limit, it has become an accounting procedure full of exceptions. A simpler and more direct version would be needed to avoid ambiguity.
The FIA should be able to identify problems in the first part of the season and introduce changes for the following year by mid-season. But without a shift in mentality, it will be difficult to avoid 2026 repeating the same mistakes: teams developing ever-faster cars that ultimately make the racing worse.
The 2022–25 regulations taught many lessons, but not enough. Without more agile governance and a genuine balance between technical freedom and race quality, Formula 1 risks once again chasing its own problems instead of overcoming them.
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