Ferrari’s SF-26 left Madrid with one of the clearest technical clues from its weekend: an unusually stiff suspension setup that helped through the heavy compression of the Monumental but cost Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc in several other crucial parts of the lap. On a Madring layout that placed very different demands on the cars, Ferrari’s mechanical compromise worked well in some areas while creating significant losses over the first chicane and during low-speed acceleration.
The new Madrid circuit proved to be a genuinely demanding technical challenge, forcing teams towards very different setup solutions. Yet the Spanish Grand Prix itself produced an extremely poor race dynamic, with the Virtual Safety Car removing much of the strategic uncertainty and the difficulty of overtaking turning the event into a long procession.
The Virtual Safety Car procedure deserves another look
The Spanish Grand Prix ultimately left a sense of emptiness and incompleteness after a race and a circuit that had been so heavily anticipated. There were relatively few meaningful talking points from Sunday, apart from a use of the Virtual Safety Car that probably deserves reconsideration.
The VSC was introduced partly to minimise the type of “sporting injustice” that can be created by a conventional Safety Car, yet if it is used in this way it risks creating at least as much inequality itself. To be clear, the stewards applied the procedure according to the regulations, and luck and misfortune will always be part of motor racing. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile for the FIA and the teams to consider possible improvements to the way the system is used, such as closing the pit lane or waiting until every driver still in the race has at least passed the pit entry between the beginning and end of the VSC period.
The consequences were particularly painful for Lando Norris, whose race was transformed by the timing of the neutralisation. The wider debate over whether Formula 1 should review the Virtual Safety Car procedure is therefore understandable after Madrid.
McLaren looked strongest, but the Madrid race made the true hierarchy difficult to judge
Lando Norris was the driver who lost out most heavily. The reigning Formula 1 world champion had been controlling the race convincingly after a strong start in which he was also aggressive, followed by an excellent opening lap. McLaren was probably the best car on the track, although that level of performance was especially evident in the hands of Lando Norris, who showed his skill at managing the tyres during the first stint, the most critical phase from a degradation perspective.
The Woking car now appears to have a stronger chassis platform than Mercedes and, as McLaren has begun extracting more effectively from its power unit, the overall package has also become stronger over race distances. However, drawing firm conclusions about the real pace order from Madrid is almost impossible.
The VSC opened the pit-stop window for every driver who had started on the medium or soft compound, effectively eliminating the strategic variable that represented the race’s only realistic source of tension. From that point, drivers were instructed to maintain a certain distance from the car ahead to avoid tyre-temperature problems, and the Grand Prix turned into an extremely long and uneventful procession.
Another important factor was the hard tyre. It was the only compound that truly appeared to work properly around Madring, while also being capable of covering almost the entire race distance, as Charles Leclerc demonstrated. From a driving perspective, Charles Leclerc’s exceptionally long stint was certainly impressive and suggested that Ferrari had good race pace and strong tyre behaviour.
Even so, the unusual nature of the race makes it difficult to place the SF-26 accurately within any genuine performance hierarchy. The simplest interpretation is that Ferrari remains fast over a race distance but continues to pay for the absence of an equally strong qualifying mode on Saturday. Its qualifying performance and sector behaviour can be examined in greater detail through the F1 Qualifying Pace & Sector Comparison.
By its nature, the Ferrari also appears to have more potential at circuits where qualifying carries greater importance, yet the limitations over a single lap mean the Scuderia repeatedly struggles to put together a package that is complete enough to win across the entire weekend.
Kimi Antonelli, meanwhile, once again ended up on the winning side. The Mercedes driver has undoubtedly enjoyed some fortunate circumstances, but he is also consistently in position to take advantage of them and, most importantly, tends not to make costly mistakes. That was again significant at a track where the barriers are never far away, especially coming immediately after the celebrations at Monza.
The start produced the only real burst of action
The only genuine moment of sustained action came at the start, when Lewis Hamilton attacked and almost reached Lando Norris before the complicated situation involving Max Verstappen developed. Red Bull’s decision to make Max Verstappen drop back behind Lewis Hamilton proved extremely costly.
Max Verstappen could have had a genuine opportunity to win the race because, at that stage, he was ahead of Kimi Antonelli. The Mercedes driver had himself run long at each of the opening two chicanes. When the priority is staying out of trouble, taking to the escape road can sometimes prove the safer option.
Red Bull and Max Verstappen nevertheless did an excellent job in qualifying of maximising the potential available from the car and giving themselves a chance on Sunday, despite a race pace that appeared inferior to at least McLaren and Mercedes.
Did Max Verstappen really need to give the position back to Lewis Hamilton?
There is also room for debate over whether Max Verstappen genuinely needed to return the position to Lewis Hamilton. Our impression is that it may not actually have been necessary given the sequence of events through the first two corners.
Lewis Hamilton was positioned very far to the inside at Turn 1 and went across the kerb, landing heavily when the Ferrari returned to the track. The impact left Lewis Hamilton with limited control of the car and unable to accelerate properly. Max Verstappen was arriving with considerably more speed and, faced with the situation, chose to cut the second corner.
It is difficult to establish whether Max Verstappen genuinely had sufficient room to remain on the circuit through Turn 2, but the incident provides a useful way of introducing what is arguably the more interesting technical subject from Ferrari’s Madrid weekend: the stiffness of the SF-26.
The Hamilton-Verstappen incident itself also became one of the main talking points after the Grand Prix, with the circumstances covered in more detail in the analysis of the Max Verstappen and Lewis Hamilton Madring incident.
Ferrari’s stiff SF-26 setup exposed its biggest Madring compromise
It was no coincidence that Lewis Hamilton’s Ferrari reacted so violently when it dropped off the Turn 1 kerb. The suspension response was so pronounced that the SF-26 effectively bounced on all four wheels. Ferrari’s unusual stiffness had already been noticeable from qualifying.
Unlike Kimi Antonelli’s Mercedes, which could attack the first chicane and cut aggressively across the kerbs, both Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc were effectively forced to drive around them. The first sector was Ferrari’s critical weakness throughout the weekend, and not simply because it contained the circuit’s main straight, where differences in power-unit performance could be exposed.
A significant proportion of Ferrari’s deficit came through the first chicane itself. Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc were losing valuable time there because the SF-26 could not attack the kerbs in the same way as some of its rivals. That contrast was particularly interesting given the very different mechanical philosophies visible in the Ferrari and Mercedes Madrid setup approaches.
The benefit of such a stiff setup, combined with the SF-26’s strong front end, became apparent in the Monumental. The banked section subjected the cars to almost 2G of additional compression, and Ferrari’s rigid platform provided important support through that phase of the lap.
However, there was a significant price to pay elsewhere. The compromise hurt Ferrari both through the opening chicane and across the final sector, where acceleration from low speeds was frequently less effective and particularly expensive in terms of lap time.
The balance Ferrari was searching for was especially important because the Madring represented a much broader technical challenge than Monza. Before the weekend, the circuit characteristics had appeared capable of offering the SF-26 a better opportunity, as examined in our analysis of why Ferrari’s SF-26 could be stronger at Madring than at Monza. In practice, however, extracting that potential required a difficult mechanical compromise.
Ferrari may have chosen stiffness instead of significantly increasing ride height
After the opening practice session, several teams were forced to raise their cars to avoid excessive plank wear through the Monumental. The impression from Ferrari’s behaviour is that Maranello instead chose to stiffen the overall suspension package.
Charles Leclerc’s final race stint on the soft tyre may provide indirect confirmation of Ferrari’s desire not to raise the car excessively. Charles Leclerc himself referred to a specific and well-known problem that should not reappear at other circuits and which prevented him from pushing during the final laps on the soft compound.
The situation was somewhat reminiscent of previous occasions when a very high tyre pressure proved particularly costly in traction and slow-speed sections. Those were precisely the areas in which Charles Leclerc became extremely slow over the closing laps.
It is important to distinguish the two points. The explanation involving tyre pressure is only a hypothesis. The considerable stiffness of the Ferrari, on the other hand, emerges much more clearly from both the available data and what could be observed from the images throughout the weekend.
The question now is whether Ferrari will already adopt a more forgiving mechanical compromise at the next round. The different demands awaiting the SF-26 are considered in the early Ferrari outlook for Baku.
Madring offered a high-level technical challenge but a deeply disappointing race
The discussion surrounding Ferrari’s suspension stiffness also leads into a broader assessment of the Madrid circuit itself. Even if it means going against the prevailing reaction in some areas, the impression from the weekend, reinforced by the comments made by the drivers, is that Formula 1 has gained a technically very interesting circuit that desperately needs changes if it is to produce overtaking and genuine race action.
The Madring contains almost every type of corner. There are chicanes that reward aggressive kerb use, fast sequences of direction changes, the banked Monumental and the slow final section. That variety forced every team to search for the correct mechanical compromise, but it also led them towards very different solutions.
Mercedes, for example, ran a much softer suspension configuration. Kimi Antonelli could attack the kerbs aggressively but had to be considerably more conservative through the Monumental. Ferrari effectively faced the opposite situation.
The contrast was already visible before the race, when Formula 1 drivers highlighted the unusual demands of the new Madrid circuit. The weekend ultimately confirmed how difficult it was to find one setup capable of working across every part of the lap.
The different energy-deployment strategies also converged only partially. Mercedes failed to optimise its package completely and left a considerable amount of performance unused in qualifying. Lando Norris still secured pole position, despite an error at the final corner, and without that mistake his advantage could potentially have been around three tenths of a second.
There was also significant work to do with the tyres over a single lap. The faster sections placed enormous demands on the front tyres, yet it remained essential to reach the final sector with the rears still inside their operating window. Without that, the driver could not generate the traction required to complete a competitive lap.
In other words, Madring produced a first-class technical puzzle. Unfortunately, that puzzle developed on a circuit that delivered a very poor race. The lack of overtaking was not merely a perception: the debut Grand Prix produced an exceptionally limited amount of passing, a problem examined in the breakdown of Madring’s overtaking difficulties in the Spanish Grand Prix.
Madrid’s layout needs changes in future seasons
That is not a minor concern for Formula 1. Madrid was one of the most eagerly anticipated additions to the calendar and produced an event that was widely praised from an organisational perspective. That point was repeated constantly throughout the weekend, although from a sporting perspective it is difficult to care very much about organisational success if the circuit itself cannot produce an entertaining race.
This is also a completely new venue with a 10-year contract that has forced its way onto the Formula 1 calendar while contributing to the displacement of established circuits such as Spa. A new track with such a long-term future cannot simply rely on the fact that it is technically challenging for the drivers and engineers.
Madring has genuine value as a technical test. Its mixture of kerbs, compression, fast corners, low-speed traction zones, tyre-management demands and energy deployment created one of the most complex setup puzzles of the season. Ferrari’s experience was perhaps the clearest example: a suspension configuration that helped the SF-26 enormously through one defining section simultaneously compromised the car elsewhere.
But technical difficulty alone is not enough. If Madrid is to justify its long-term place in Formula 1, changes to the layout over the coming years should not be considered merely an option. After the racing produced by its debut Grand Prix, they should be regarded as an absolute necessity.
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