
Ferrari’s Italian Grand Prix exposed a difficult chain reaction within the SF-26: an aerodynamic efficiency deficit combined with insufficient straight-line performance forced the drivers to compensate elsewhere, ultimately creating further problems with the tyres. The result was a complicated Monza weekend that ended with Charles Leclerc retiring and questions over whether Ferrari could have adopted a more aggressive strategy with Lewis Hamilton during the second half of the race.
Monza placed particular emphasis on top speed and energy deployment, two areas in which Ferrari struggled to match its main rivals. The weakness did not simply cost lap time on the straights. It also affected overtaking, defensive driving, tyre management and the strategic options available to the pit wall, turning what initially appeared to be one performance limitation into several interconnected problems for the SF-26.
Ferrari’s Soft tyre gamble fails to deliver at Monza
When the lights went out, Ferrari chose to split from the strategy adopted by much of the leading group by starting both SF-26 cars on the Soft compound. It was an aggressive gamble compared with George Russell and the McLaren drivers, who opted for a considerably more conservative plan based around starting on Medium tyres before switching to the Hard compound and running to the chequered flag.
The decision to use the Soft was technically extreme. With the track temperature reaching 57°C, there was a genuine risk of repeating the tactical difficulties experienced in Budapest by effectively reversing the natural order of the compounds relative to the evolving thermal conditions of the circuit. Ferrari also chose not to differentiate the strategies of Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc, increasing the overall level of risk. Red Bull made the same tyre choice with Max Verstappen.
Ultimately, with the two Ferrari drivers becoming involved in on-track friction and Charles Leclerc later crashing at the Parabolica, the Soft tyre gamble failed to produce the hoped-for return. Charles Leclerc’s retirement became another painful chapter in a weekend during which Ferrari’s weaknesses were sharply contrasted by Kimi Antonelli’s recovery drive.
The red flag caused by Charles Leclerc’s accident effectively became a lifeline for Lewis Hamilton from a tyre perspective. It reset much of the strategic picture and allowed Ferrari to concentrate on finding a compound capable of lasting through the remainder of the race.
Had the Soft tyre performed as intended, the seven-time Formula 1 world champion could have gained considerably from the interruption triggered by his team-mate’s crash. Instead, the stoppage gave Ferrari an opportunity to correct its original choice by putting Lewis Hamilton on the Medium compound and effectively mirroring the strategy of the McLarens, which were among Ferrari’s main targets during the race.
Should Ferrari have stopped Lewis Hamilton under the VSC?
A switch to a two-stop strategy was an option that deserved serious consideration. On lap 30, with the Virtual Safety Car deployed, Ferrari decided to prioritise track position and kept Lewis Hamilton on track. The decision came while the British driver was delivering increasingly negative feedback over the radio, complaining that the Medium tyres fitted during the red-flag period were giving him very little pace or consistency.
The recurring problem was significant understeer. Lewis Hamilton was forced to make repeated adjustments through the steering-wheel controls as he tried to manage the front end of the SF-26. Despite those complaints, Ferrari elected to take the tyre set to the finish. In hindsight, and particularly when considering the seven-time world champion’s feedback from the cockpit, changing tyres appeared to be the more logical alternative.
Ferrari’s initial tyre allocation also made the situation particularly interesting. Lewis Hamilton had one new set of each compound available as well as three used sets of Soft tyres. Having already used his fresh Medium and Soft sets, the only untouched compound remaining was the Hard.
Leaving aside Kimi Antonelli’s unreachable pace, that was essentially the route taken by Max Verstappen: stop under the VSC, fit a new set of Hard tyres and push through to the chequered flag. Ferrari could therefore have fitted Lewis Hamilton with the white-walled compound and attempted the same approach.
However, there was a major strategic obstacle. Ferrari calculated that making the pit stop would have cost Lewis Hamilton around five positions. Whether those places could have been recovered across the remaining 27 laps was far from certain, especially given the SF-26’s difficulty overtaking. Fred Vasseur later explained in greater detail why Ferrari decided against Lewis Hamilton’s VSC pit stop.
The problem was that Ferrari’s car was particularly vulnerable when attempting passes and equally ineffective when trying to defend position. By surrendering track position, the team risked placing Lewis Hamilton behind cars that he might simply have been unable to overtake, regardless of the advantage provided by fresher tyres. Mercedes faced its own tyre and race-planning decisions at Monza, with Kimi Antonelli’s Monza strategy illustrating how differently the competitive packages could approach the race.
Ferrari SF-26 energy deficit becomes decisive at Monza
Ferrari has traditionally tended to extract some of its strongest performance over a race distance, but at Monza that equation was reversed. Straight-line speed became essential not only for attacking but also for maintaining track position, and that was one of the SF-26’s biggest weaknesses during the Italian Grand Prix. Without sufficient top speed, Ferrari lacked its most important weapon on Monza’s long straights even when the lap-time picture elsewhere remained relatively encouraging.
“We struggle on the straights, even though the pace was good. We couldn’t overtake when we had the opportunity,” Fred Vasseur admitted after the race.
The technical problem was straightforward but extremely costly. In order to complete an overtake and compensate for Ferrari’s straight-line deficit, Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc had to draw on additional electrical energy. That could leave them with reduced deployment available through the following sections of the lap.
This unfavourable energy balance made both Ferrari drivers vulnerable to rivals at different stages of the race. Reliability itself was not the principal concern; efficiency was. Ferrari’s wider SF-26 Power Unit performance depends not simply on maximum horsepower but on how effectively the entire system can deliver and manage energy around the lap.
To remain close to their rivals’ lap times, Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc therefore had to attack the corners more aggressively. That additional push, combined with an oversteer-biased balance, increased the stress placed on the tyres. Ferrari’s attempt to compensate for one weakness was effectively generating another.
“We know the numbers and we know that at Monza there is enormous sensitivity to top speed,” Fred Vasseur added.
Ferrari’s ADUO2 upgrade cannot erase the Monza deficit
Within the paddock, the view that Ferrari is slipping out of championship contention has strengthened, particularly because the ADUO2 development did not produce the level of improvement some supporters had hoped to see. However, Fred Vasseur had already warned that Ferrari’s second development step on the internal combustion engine would not simply eliminate the entire deficit.
The objective of the update






