A few laps could have completely changed the face of the 2025 Formula 1 Australian Grand Prix, whose outcome seemed predetermined after a straightforward first part of the race without major surprises. The return of rain on lap 44 became the variable that shuffled the strategic deck at the 5.278-kilometre Albert Park Grand Prix Circuit in Melbourne.
Some teams immediately identified the perfect moment to pit for intermediates, while others floundered in the deluge. Among them was Ferrari, a scenario that reflected a rude awakening in a Melbourne weekend that had started well but ended with more doubts than certainties and, most importantly, far from the expectations formed on the eve of the race.
After the race, Ferrari team principal Frederic Vasseur stated that they certainly could have done better in terms of strategy but acknowledged that it was easier to assess in hindsight, attempting to explain a seemingly incomprehensible strategic decision, namely staying out on dry tires while the track was flooded. But was it really as incomprehensible as it first appeared?
In order to understand the roots of this choice, we need to go back a few laps to when the race director gave the green flag after Fernando Alonso’s incident. Teams had already been tracking an incoming weather system on their radars for several laps, knowing it would arrive before the end of the Australian Grand Prix. This information was also relayed to both Ferrari drivers, with strategists pinpointing the exact moment the rain would hit, as evident from Charles Leclerc’s radio communications.
The first drops fell on lap 43, intensifying in the following lap, particularly in the third sector. Drivers immediately began struggling to stay on track, with both McLaren cars sliding into the gravel at the exit of Turn 12, while Charles Leclerc spun and lost a few places. At that point, strategies diverged. In the preceding laps, teams had already been monitoring the radar and saw that the rain would be so intense that staying on slicks would be nearly impossible. The Mercedes strategists, for example, immediately called both drivers in, a tactic that ultimately proved effective.
A similar reasoning was made by McLaren, facilitated by the fact that its drivers had gone off track, as well as by Williams, Aston Martin, and Sauber.
On the other hand, other teams took the opposite approach. So did staying out make sense? This is where the key aspect of the situation emerges. Max Verstappen, like the Ferrari drivers, chose to stay on track and continue, providing feedback on the track surface conditions. The crucial factor in understanding Ferrari’s decision is that, in the first two sectors, the track was still mostly dry, with rain limited to the third sector. It is no coincidence that no driver pitted immediately after the McLaren duo, as the track was still in acceptable condition outside the final sector.
It is also important to remember that teams expected heavy rain, but only for a short duration. According to Ferrari’s calculations, it should have lasted two, at most three, laps. If it hadn’t spread to the rest of the circuit and the track had dried quickly, surviving on slicks could have made sense. However, the situation changed on the following lap, the 46th of the race. Aside from the Haas drivers, who followed a different logic, the only ones still on slicks besides the Ferrari cars were Max Verstappen, Pierre Gasly, and Yuki Tsunoda. Just like the previous lap, their times in the first two sectors remained competitive.
This does not mean that those on intermediates weren’t gaining time, but for those who stayed out on slicks, there was still some flexibility in playing with strategy. This is why even Red Bull had doubts about how to proceed. The main factor that led the Milton Keynes team to pit was the risk of losing the window to rejoin ahead of George Russell if they stayed out another lap, which would mean giving up second place for a gamble that might not have paid off.
For Max Verstappen, the decision was strategic, whereas for Pierre Gasly, the choice to pit was more personal than dictated by the team, as the Frenchman felt there was too much water in the third sector for slicks. This left only four drivers on track with dry tires: the Ferrari drivers, Yuki Tsunoda, and Esteban Ocon.
Neither Lewis Hamilton nor Charles Leclerc had been informed that Max Verstappen had pitted, which could have been useful information for the drivers. Ferrari’s pit wall decided to continue, expecting the rain to last only a few laps and gambling on that prediction. The same reasoning applied to Racing Bulls, which, despite some hesitation, told Yuki Tsunoda to stay out, believing conditions would not worsen. Another factor to consider is that there were no clear references to understand what was happening in the first two sectors, as the field had bunched up after the Safety Car period.
To illustrate, Ferrari’s last relevant data point for the first sector came from Gabriel Bortoleto on intermediates, who was about fifteen seconds behind the pack and reached that section while Lewis Hamilton was already in Turn 12. The Brazilian’s lap time was 31.780 seconds, compared to the 30.967 recorded by the Ferrari driver on slicks.
Without trackside spotters and reference times, it was difficult to realize that within a minute, the downpour would reach the first sector as well. The only useful data came from Esteban Ocon, but he was far off the pace, lapping ten seconds slower than Lewis Hamilton. That was an eternity, a clear signal that rain had arrived in the first sector too. The problem was that this data only became available after the Ferrari driver had already passed the pit entry, meaning that even this crucial reference point was not actionable.
After the race, Ferrari team principal Frederic Vasseur admitted that they should have pitted a lap earlier, just like Max Verstappen did. Indeed, the French manager was right. It was a mistake to push on and gamble on a strategy that ultimately did not pay off, taking excessive risks. However, the broader context provides a clearer picture of Ferrari’s decision-making process.
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