F1, Flexi Floor: the fine line between genius and illegality. The sporting fate of a technical project is often linked to the fine line between genius and illegality.

The recent statements made by the FIA ​​Technical Director, Nikolas Tombazis, in the in-depth Tech Talk produced by Formula 1 regarding the floor flexibility of some 2022 Formula 1 single-seaters, raise an age-old question: in the modern era, winning cars have always distinguished themselves through particular interpretations of the technical regulations. Which made some cars truly unbeatable. Just think of the DAS (Dual Axis Steering, nda) system used by Mercedes in the 2020 season which, through the longitudinal movement of the steering wheel, made it possible to intervene on the convergence of the front tires.

The solution displaced the competition but despite the complaints of competitors and doubts related to the safety of a delicate component such as the steering box, the device was approved by the FIA. The ingenious solution of Mercedes’ engineers was banned with the review of the technical regulation for the 2021 Formula 1 season.

The sporting fate of a technical project is often linked to the fine line between genius and illegality. The ability in the borderline interpretation of the technical regulation is the basis of a winning project. The enormous anomaly is that the line of this border is linked to the advantage drawn from the better intuition of the designers.

The governing body of Formula 1 has often brought solutions which were initially approved by itself, to the field of illegality. The controversy of the DAS system an example. In other circumstances, the FIA made not very clear judgments as in the case of the Mercedes perforated wheel rims.

Returning to actuality, the technical directive 039 has imposed new rigidity criteria for the plank positioned in the central area of ​​the floor. Why introduce a change to the technical regulation apparently unrelated to the porpoising phenomenon?

Some teams have exploited a loophole in the technical regulation to maximize the ground effect of their cars. The plank (or skate, nda) is the longitudinal central section positioned in the floor of the car. The technical regulation allowed the breakdown of this element up to a maximum number of three parts (skid block, nda).

The plank is equipped with holes through which the FIA ​​delegates carry out measurements on the wear of the component. The holes in the front area of ​​the skate are strengthened with titanium plates that help minimize the risk of floor damage. Before TD039, checks on the height of the floor were carried out only on the front area.

The technical regulation, regarding plank flexibility, reads as follows: “The plank can deflect no more than 2 mm in correspondence with the two holes in XF = 1080 and no more than 2 mm on the rearmost hole, when the car, without driver, is supported in these positions. The car will be supported by 70mm diameter bearings, centered on the holes and in contact only with the lower part of the axle group of boards. The displacement will be measured on the supports, with respect to the reference plane at the center of each hole”.

In the technical checks carried out by the delegates of the International Federation, no single-seater was found to be illegal. The designers have identified the flexibility of the skid as a solution to be able to use very low set-ups with respect to the reference plane, with an enormous advantage in terms of vertical load generated by the car floor. This design direction was possible because:

-the plank can be made up of several skid-blocks (maximum 3, nda).
-The rear part of the skate was not subject to checks regarding its wear.

Although some team principals said that the Technical Directive 39/22 was irrelevant for the performance of their respective cars, the modification of the technical regulation inherent to the flexibility of the plank does not seem to be marginal. The inability to exploit the brilliant idea of ​​the “Flexi Floor” forced a review of the single-seater setups in order not to incur excessive wear of the plank in the central and rear area.

Conversely, in the case of Red Bull, introduction of the Technical Directive 39/22 seems to have given RB18 greater performance. However, it seems difficult to estimate whether the performance improvement of the Milton Keynes team’s car is the result of a better adaptation to the new regulation framework or to the performance downgrade of direct competition, mainly Ferrari.

The inclusion of the new discipline on the control of floor flexibility was clearly explained by Nikolas Tombazis and justified by safety reasons but also the intention to have cars which are much closer in terms of performance. Regardless of the questionable choice of integrating a technical measure within a directive that should only have provided a metric for calculating and controlling porpoising, the desired performance balance seems to have failed dramatically, as pointed out by funoanalisitecnica.com.

In fact, the conditions will probably lead to a long domination of a competitor, an effect diametrically opposite to the intentions of the FIA ​​and Liberty Media. The new course of Formula 1 cannot afford a new hegemony of a competitor, especially in an unprecedented phase of globalization of the sport.