Charles Leclerc’s fourth place and Lewis Hamilton’s third tell only part of Ferrari’s story at Sepang. After a disastrous start from a strategic point of view, the SF-26 recovered to the leading positions thanks to competitive race pace and the numerous neutralisations that repeatedly reshuffled the field.
But precisely because Ferrari showed that it had strong pace, another question becomes even more interesting: how much could the team have achieved if the pit wall had managed the opening phase differently?
There is no definitive answer. As we also highlighted in our own analysis, the repeated Safety Cars continually reset the gaps, making it impossible to establish with certainty what Ferrari would have achieved with another strategy. Doing so would require a crystal ball.
There is, however, another question that is perhaps even more important: with two Ferraris on track, why did the team not diversify its strategy?
Ferrari put both cars on slicks in uncertain conditions
The situation was particularly delicate. Following the delayed start and the change in track conditions, Ferrari chose slick tyres for both cars. The decision initially proved costly, while those starting on Intermediates were able to gain ground rapidly.
That was one of the key points we highlighted in our video. Ferrari had two cars available and, in such uncertain circumstances, could potentially have used one of them as an immediate reference for understanding how the track was developing.
This does not mean that a different strategy would automatically have guaranteed a podium. It simply means Ferrari could have divided the risk: one car on slicks and the other on Intermediates, giving the team two different scenarios to follow.
The broader tyre picture from the Malaysian weekend can also be explored through our analysis of how Pirelli’s Sepang compounds suited the Ferrari SF-26, while the complete compound and stint sequences can be compared through the F1 Tyre & Stint Analysis.
Charles Leclerc says Ferrari must take a step forward on strategy
After the race, Charles Leclerc acknowledged that the initial decision had not been the correct one. The Monegasque explained that Ferrari tends to choose the more cautious solution and admitted that, in those situations, other teams are sometimes able to make more effective decisions.
The comparison made by the Ferrari driver was very specific: Red Bull.
According to Charles Leclerc, Ferrari needs to take a step forward in the way it manages strategy. It is an important admission because the discussion is not simply about how fast the car is. It is also about the team’s ability to read the race as circumstances change.
Why not put the two Ferraris on different strategies?
This is where the central issue emerges. If Ferrari was not completely certain that the circuit was ready for slick tyres, why not use its two cars to cover both possibilities?
With two cars, a team can take a risk with one while protecting itself with the other. If the track had dried quickly, the Ferrari on slicks could have gained an advantage. If conditions had remained too wet, the car on Intermediates could have limited the damage.
It would effectively have given the team a form of strategic insurance. Not a guarantee of success, but one more possibility.
The decision can also be viewed alongside Ferrari’s wider strategic execution, which can be tracked through the Ferrari pit-stop and strategy data.
Charles Leclerc explains the downside of splitting strategies
Charles Leclerc’s explanation also opens another discussion. He pointed out that dividing the strategies in those conditions would have created the risk of one driver having an excellent race while the other was heavily penalised by the opposite choice.
That is an entirely understandable consideration. If two team-mates receive different strategies, one can suddenly find himself with a huge advantage over the other.
But that leads to another question: should that really be the main concern when a team is trying to maximise its overall result?
Should the team result come first?
Formula 1 is an individual sport, but it is also a team sport. Lewis Hamilton races for his own result. Charles Leclerc races for his own result. Ferrari, however, is also competing in the Constructors’ Championship.
The pit wall therefore has to pursue the highest possible combined points total. If one strategy proves clearly superior to the other, one driver will inevitably benefit more than his team-mate.
That does not necessarily mean the team made the wrong decision. It could simply mean Ferrari deliberately chose to cover two different possible race scenarios.
The season-long balance between the two drivers can be followed in the Charles Leclerc and Lewis Hamilton season comparison.
When one Ferrari is already out of position, risk can become a weapon
There is another, more specific situation to consider. If one driver has already fallen a long way from the leading positions, that car could be the one used to try something different.
An aggressive strategy can become an opportunity. If it works, the team gains. If it fails, the damage is more limited because that car was already not ideally placed to secure a major result.
That is a very different philosophy from committing both cars to precisely the same approach.
Two Ferrari cars mean two strategic opportunities
This is probably the most important point. Having two cars does not simply mean twice the opportunity to score points. It also offers a team the chance to cover different scenarios.
One Ferrari can follow the more conservative strategy while the other takes a more aggressive approach. One can cover a rival while the other anticipates a change. One can use one tyre compound while its team-mate tries the alternative.
In certain situations, that flexibility can turn having two cars into a major strategic advantage.
Ferrari put all its eggs in one basket at Sepang
At Sepang, Ferrari essentially committed both cars to the same direction. When that decision initially proved wrong, both drivers paid the price.
The problem was therefore not simply the decision to use slicks. It was also the decision to expose both cars to the same risk.
As we highlighted in our video, if Ferrari had doubts about the track conditions, it could have sent only one car out on slicks and observed how the situation developed before committing completely to that approach.
Red Bull becomes Charles Leclerc’s reference point
Charles Leclerc’s comments therefore carry even greater significance. The Ferrari driver did not simply acknowledge that the Sepang strategy had been wrong. He also recognised that other teams more frequently make the right decisions in similar situations and specifically identified Red Bull as a benchmark.
For Ferrari, that should be a warning sign. The challenge is not merely deciding which tyre to fit. It is understanding when to take a risk, how much risk to accept and, above all, how to use two cars to reduce the team’s overall exposure.
A fast Ferrari is not enough without strong execution
The Sepang race demonstrated something else as well. Ferrari had enough performance to recover after its disastrous opening phase.
Lewis Hamilton climbed all the way back to the podium, while Charles Leclerc finished fourth. That makes the strategic issue even harder to overlook.
If the SF-26 had lacked pace, Ferrari could simply have pointed to a technical limitation. But when a car is able to recover so much after its race has initially been compromised by strategy, it is inevitable to wonder what might have been possible with stronger management from the beginning.
On that point, however, it is important to remain realistic. There is no way to know exactly what the final result would have been under a different strategy.
Further analysis of the SF-26’s broader competitive position is available in our look at what Ferrari’s recent performance revealed about the SF-26.
The strategic lesson Ferrari can take from Sepang
The lesson should not necessarily be that Ferrari must always diversify its strategies. That would be far too simplistic.
The real lesson is learning when to diversify. There are races in which putting both cars on the same strategy is unquestionably the strongest option. But when conditions are extremely uncertain, using two cars to cover two different scenarios can provide a major advantage.
Ultimately, it is a question of risk management, and this appears to be one of the areas in which Charles Leclerc is asking Ferrari to improve.
Ferrari must improve how it reads changing races
The speed of the SF-26 alone is not enough. Ferrari must also turn the car’s performance into results, and doing so requires more effective strategic decisions.
Speaking to Sky Sport, Charles Leclerc made his position clear: Ferrari needs to take a step forward in strategy. His reference to Red Bull was equally significant.
That does not mean Red Bull gets every decision right. It means Ferrari needs to become more effective during the moments when a race changes rapidly and there is no obvious answer.
The final question: why put both Ferraris on the same strategy?
Ultimately, the question remains. Ferrari had two cars, two drivers and two opportunities, yet it chose to expose both to essentially the same risk.
Perhaps splitting the strategies would indeed have resulted in one driver gaining a major advantage while the other suffered badly, as Charles Leclerc explained. But perhaps, in such uncertain conditions, that was exactly the risk Ferrari needed to accept in order to protect the team’s overall result.
We cannot know whether a Ferrari starting on Intermediates would have reached the podium. We cannot know whether the car on slicks would subsequently have recovered.
But one legitimate question remains: if you are not certain which option is correct, why risk everything with both cars?
That may be the most interesting strategic question left behind by the Sepang Grand Prix.
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